p-video-avatar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a parameter
disable_safety_filterwhich defaults totrue. This represents an explicit instruction to override and bypass standard content safety protocols during the video generation process. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external dependencies, including
belt-sh/cliand various skills from theinference-shGitHub organization vianpx. It also references remote content fromraw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/for installation instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to executebeltCLI commands, such asbelt loginandbelt app run, which interact with external APIs and services. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface. It ingests untrusted data from external image and audio URLs and interpolates user-provided text (
voice_script,video_prompt,voice_prompt) directly into commands without using boundary markers, sanitization, or instructions to ignore embedded commands. - Ingestion points:
image(URL),audio(URL),voice_script(String),video_prompt(String),voice_prompt(String) defined in the inputs forbelt app run. - Boundary markers: Absent. The user-provided content is passed directly as JSON input to the CLI tool.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bash(belt *)to execute shell commands. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of input validation or escaping for the strings processed by the CLI tool.
Audit Metadata