agent-browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from arbitrary external websites, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where website content could attempt to override agent instructions.\n
- Ingestion points: Web page content is ingested into the agent's context through functions like
snapshot,execute, andscreenshotas defined inSKILL.mdandreferences/commands.md.\n - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities that could be targeted by an injection, such as clicking elements, filling forms, uploading files, and executing arbitrary JavaScript (
SKILL.md,references/commands.md).\n - Boundary markers: The provided automation templates (e.g.,
templates/capture-workflow.sh) do not implement boundary markers or specific instructions to isolate or ignore potential commands within fetched web data.\n - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of the DOM content or text extracted from web pages before it is presented to the agent.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
executefunction enables the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code within the browser context, which can be used to manipulate page state or extract information (references/commands.md).\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and templates frequently execute shell commands using thebeltandinfshCLI tools to perform browser actions (SKILL.md,templates/authenticated-session.sh).\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Documentation within the skill provides examples for extracting sensitive session data, such asdocument.cookie, and supports uploading local files to remote forms (references/authentication.md,SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata