ai-automation-workflows

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides numerous templates (e.g., data_processing.sh and content_pipeline.sh) that ingest untrusted external data and interpolate it directly into LLM prompts without sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the context via cat $file in the processing script and from API responses stored in the RESEARCH variable.
  • Boundary markers: The templates do not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Bash(belt *) for shell access, subprocess.run in Python scripts, and has network capabilities via curl and the belt CLI.
  • Sanitization: No escaping, filtering, or validation is performed on the data before it is interpolated into the JSON-formatted prompts.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill explicitly documents how to establish persistence on the host system using cron jobs to automate AI workflows.
  • Evidence: The 'Scheduled Automation' section provides instructions for using crontab -e to set up daily, weekly, and hourly task execution.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages the installation of additional skills and CLI tools from remote sources.
  • Evidence: Instructions include npx skills add belt-sh/cli and multiple references to other skills hosted in the inference-sh GitHub repository.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on extensive shell scripting and Python's subprocess module to orchestrate external tools.
  • Evidence: The automation.py script uses subprocess.run to execute the belt CLI with dynamic input data, and multiple bash scripts perform file system operations and network calls.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 01:13 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ai-automation-workflows