ai-automation-workflows
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides numerous templates (e.g.,
data_processing.shandcontent_pipeline.sh) that ingest untrusted external data and interpolate it directly into LLM prompts without sanitization or boundary markers. - Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
cat $filein the processing script and from API responses stored in theRESEARCHvariable. - Boundary markers: The templates do not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bash(belt *)for shell access,subprocess.runin Python scripts, and has network capabilities viacurland thebeltCLI. - Sanitization: No escaping, filtering, or validation is performed on the data before it is interpolated into the JSON-formatted prompts.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill explicitly documents how to establish persistence on the host system using cron jobs to automate AI workflows.
- Evidence: The 'Scheduled Automation' section provides instructions for using
crontab -eto set up daily, weekly, and hourly task execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages the installation of additional skills and CLI tools from remote sources.
- Evidence: Instructions include
npx skills add belt-sh/cliand multiple references to other skills hosted in theinference-shGitHub repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on extensive shell scripting and Python's
subprocessmodule to orchestrate external tools. - Evidence: The
automation.pyscript usessubprocess.runto execute thebeltCLI with dynamic input data, and multiple bash scripts perform file system operations and network calls.
Audit Metadata