ai-content-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines complex multi-step workflows where output from one AI model (e.g., a script from Claude) is used as input for another model (e.g., Kokoro TTS or OmniHuman). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions could be embedded in intermediate data to influence subsequent steps.
- Ingestion points: The pipeline scripts ingest text outputs, image URLs, and audio URLs across different bash steps (e.g.,
script.jsontovoice.json). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill uses standard JSON input formats without specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute
beltCLI commands through Bash to perform network-based media generation and merging. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the intermediate data passed between pipeline steps.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and downloads documentation and configuration from
inference.shand its associated GitHub repository (github.com/inference-sh). These downloads are integral to the skill's stated purpose of using the platform's CLI. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
beltCLI via Bash to perform its primary functions. The execution is constrained to thebeltbinary as specified in the skill'sallowed-toolsconfiguration.
Audit Metadata