ai-content-pipeline

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines complex multi-step workflows where output from one AI model (e.g., a script from Claude) is used as input for another model (e.g., Kokoro TTS or OmniHuman). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions could be embedded in intermediate data to influence subsequent steps.
  • Ingestion points: The pipeline scripts ingest text outputs, image URLs, and audio URLs across different bash steps (e.g., script.json to voice.json).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill uses standard JSON input formats without specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute belt CLI commands through Bash to perform network-based media generation and merging.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the intermediate data passed between pipeline steps.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and downloads documentation and configuration from inference.sh and its associated GitHub repository (github.com/inference-sh). These downloads are integral to the skill's stated purpose of using the platform's CLI.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the belt CLI via Bash to perform its primary functions. The execution is constrained to the belt binary as specified in the skill's allowed-tools configuration.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 01:13 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ai-content-pipeline