ai-rag-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pattern that processes untrusted data from external web sources and injects it directly into LLM prompts.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
tavily/search-assistant,exa/search, andtavily/extractoutputs as demonstrated inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Prompt templates lack explicit delimiters or instructions to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded in the retrieved web content.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured with
Bash(belt *)permissions, allowing it to execute tools on the platform. - Sanitization: No evidence of data sanitization or filtering of the retrieved content before prompt interpolation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user to download and install external software and configurations from the vendor's infrastructure.
- Evidence: References installation of the
belt-sh/cliand various skill packages from theinference-shorganization vianpx. - Evidence: Links to installation instructions hosted at
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md.
Audit Metadata