ai-rag-pipeline

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pattern that processes untrusted data from external web sources and injects it directly into LLM prompts.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through tavily/search-assistant, exa/search, and tavily/extract outputs as demonstrated in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Prompt templates lack explicit delimiters or instructions to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded in the retrieved web content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is configured with Bash(belt *) permissions, allowing it to execute tools on the platform.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of data sanitization or filtering of the retrieved content before prompt interpolation.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user to download and install external software and configurations from the vendor's infrastructure.
  • Evidence: References installation of the belt-sh/cli and various skill packages from the inference-sh organization via npx.
  • Evidence: Links to installation instructions hosted at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 01:13 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ai-rag-pipeline