twitter-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs users to install the
beltCLI from a remote repository and references an installation script hosted on GitHub (inference-sh/skills). These resources are associated with the primary service being automated. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user content, such as tweet text and direct messages, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Input fields for
x/post-tweet,x/post-create, andx/dm-sendinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Uses JSON structure for input formatting, but lacks specific instructions for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed text.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to runbeltCLI applications, which perform network operations and social media actions. - Sanitization: Input is passed through JSON-encoded strings which provides structural delimitation, though no semantic filtering of the content is performed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is built around executing shell commands via the
beltCLI to perform all its functions, as restricted by theallowed-toolsfrontmatter field.
Audit Metadata