twitter-automation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs users to install the belt CLI from a remote repository and references an installation script hosted on GitHub (inference-sh/skills). These resources are associated with the primary service being automated.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user content, such as tweet text and direct messages, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Input fields for x/post-tweet, x/post-create, and x/dm-send in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Uses JSON structure for input formatting, but lacks specific instructions for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to run belt CLI applications, which perform network operations and social media actions.
  • Sanitization: Input is passed through JSON-encoded strings which provides structural delimitation, though no semantic filtering of the content is performed.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is built around executing shell commands via the belt CLI to perform all its functions, as restricted by the allowed-tools frontmatter field.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 01:13 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — twitter-automation