magic-hour-campaign-kit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
references/finishing.mddescribe using FFmpeg locally to assemble ads, such as padding, overlaying logos, and drawing text. The skill specifically includes a security warning to prevent command injection by using text files for copy (drawtext=textfile=…) instead of splicing arbitrary strings directly into shell commands. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided inputs like copy, headlines, and brand references to generate media assets, creating an attack surface for instructions embedded in that data.
- Ingestion points: User creative files, brand briefs, and ad copy (headlines, CTAs) ingested via
SKILL.mdandreferences/brand-reference.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions recommend using specific layout layers and copy regions to isolate text, and advise using dedicated text files for tool inputs to maintain separation between data and execution logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes image/video generation tools, local FFmpeg execution, and network API communication with the Magic Hour backend.
- Sanitization:
references/finishing.mdexplicitly warns against splicing untrusted copy into shell commands or filter expressions, directing the agent to use safer rendering methods. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server at
https://mcp.magichour.ai/and references an OpenAPI definition athttps://docs.magichour.ai/api-reference/openapi.jsonto perform its intended functions. These resources are hosted on the vendor's own official infrastructure.
Audit Metadata