ffmpeg
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several Python scripts (
audio-inspect,extract-review-frames,ffmpeg-preflight,media-intake) to execute localffmpegandffprobecommands via thesubprocessmodule. This is the primary intended purpose of the skill. The implementation follows security best practices by using list-based arguments instead of shell strings to prevent command injection, and includes hardcoded resource bounds such asMAX_FILES_HARD,MAX_TIMEOUT_HARD, andMAX_OUTPUT_BYTES_HARDto prevent resource exhaustion or denial-of-service attacks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill handles untrusted external data in the form of media files and transcripts. It mitigates potential risks by defining a strict 'Evidence-driven media work' workflow (described in
references/media-intake-and-manifest.md) that separates technical measurements from editorial interpretations. It explicitly instructs the agent not to infer meaning or identity from technical metadata and requires human review for editorial decisions. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: No remote code execution patterns were detected. All tool execution is limited to local binaries (
ffmpeg,ffprobe) and local Python scripts that do not fetch or execute remote payloads. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documentation (
references/advanced-operations-and-safety.md) explicitly warns against sending sensitive data over network protocols and recommends restricting network access. It emphasizes the use of a private task workspace to contain media and artifacts. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill does not perform any operations requiring elevated privileges. It uses
-n(no-overwrite) by default in FFmpeg commands to prevent accidental file modification.
Audit Metadata