langchain
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides documentation and code templates for building Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and tool-using agents, which are susceptible to indirect prompt injection from untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points:
templates/rag-pipeline.pyandreferences/rag-strategies.mddemonstrate ingesting data from external URLs usingWebBaseLoader(e.g.,https://example.com/docs). - Boundary markers: Prompt templates demonstrated in
templates/rag-pipeline.pyandreferences/rag-strategies.mddo not include explicit delimiters or instructions for the LLM to ignore embedded commands within the retrieved context. - Capability inventory: Templates such as
templates/agent-with-tools.pyenable agents to call external tools (e.g.,search_web), which could be triggered by adversarial instructions in retrieved content. - Sanitization: The provided examples do not demonstrate sanitization or validation of documents before they are injected into the model prompt.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The setup verification script uses dynamic module loading to check the local environment.
- Evidence: The file
scripts/check-setup.pyuses__import__to programmatically verify the presence of required and optional packages likelangchainandlangchain_openai. This is a standard and safe implementation for a diagnostic tool. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation encourages the installation of several external packages from the LangChain ecosystem.
- Evidence: Files such as
references/architecture.mdandreferences/faq-and-troubleshooting.mdcontain instructions topip installvarious well-known packages includinglangchain,langchain-community, and provider-specific integrations from established organizations.
Audit Metadata