llamaindex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion and processing of external documents using
SimpleDirectoryReader, which creates a surface for potential indirect prompt injection attacks where untrusted data could influence agent responses. - Ingestion points: External files are loaded into the agent context in
templates/basic-rag.py,templates/agentic-rag.py, andtemplates/custom-workflow.py. - Boundary markers: The templates rely on the framework's default prompt orchestration; they do not explicitly demonstrate the use of XML delimiters or specialized sanitization to isolate untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides capabilities for file system access, network communication with LLM providers, and complex logic execution via Workflows.
- Sanitization: No explicit filtering or sanitization of document content is implemented in the reference templates.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The verification utility
scripts/check-setup.pyuses dynamic importing to confirm the presence of LlamaIndex-related dependencies. - Evidence: The script uses
importlib.import_module()to check for packages listed in theREQUIRED_PACKAGESandOPTIONAL_PACKAGESarrays. - Context: This is a standard and safe diagnostic practice as the package names are hardcoded and not derived from untrusted user input.
Audit Metadata