skillopt

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The test suite file tests/test_run_post_merge_task.py utilizes the exec() function to execute Python code that is dynamically extracted from the scripts/run-phase.sh shell script. While used for unit testing internal logic, the execution of code strings extracted at runtime is a significant security risk.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core logic in scripts/run-phase.sh, scripts/seed-board.sh, and scripts/archive-run.sh relies heavily on subprocess.run to call the hermes CLI and other system utilities. These calls often involve dynamically generated prompts and arguments, creating a large surface for potential command injection if input data is not perfectly sanitized.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation (README.md and SKILL.md) instructs users to download the skill repository directly from a third-party GitHub repository (https://github.com/magnus919/hermes-SkillOpt). This represents a supply-chain risk as the repository is not from a verified or well-known trusted organization.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and execute external task instructions (via test-suite.json) during the 'Rollout' and 'Validate' phases. This creates a significant surface for Indirect Prompt Injection, where malicious instructions in a test suite could cause the agent to perform unauthorized actions during the optimization process.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell-to-python heredocs (python3 << 'PYEOF') extensively to process JSON data and perform calculations. This technique, while common in complex orchestration scripts, increases the complexity of the execution environment and potential for injection vulnerabilities.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 11, 2026, 01:44 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — skillopt