sparebank1-shared
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install an external binary using
cargo install sparebank1-cli. This downloads and executes unverified third-party code from a public registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is to execute the
sb1CLI binary to perform actions like authentication, account listing, and transaction retrieval. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill describes a configuration option (
SB1_STORE=file) that stores authentication tokens in plaintext within the user's home directory (~/.config/sparebank1-cli/*.json). While documented as opt-in for headless use, this increases the risk of credential exposure if the local system is compromised. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from an external API.
- Ingestion points: Account names and transaction descriptions retrieved from the SpareBank 1 API (e.g., via
sb1 transactions). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content in API responses are defined.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands via the
sb1CLI and access the local file system for configuration. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the data fetched from the bank API before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata