ai-agent-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides educational code snippets for a
run_commandtool usingsubprocess.runwithshell=True(SKILL.md). This pattern is a significant security anti-practice that enables command injection if the input command is not strictly sanitized, especially when generated by an LLM. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The 'Pattern 4: ReAct' example in SKILL.md explicitly demonstrates an agent thinking about and executing a search for an API key within a
.envfile (evidence:Action: search_files("*.env", "API_KEY")). This provides a blueprint for credential harvesting. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes an architecture for agents that process untrusted data from multiple sources.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent via
user_requestandtool_resultsfrom web searches or file reads (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The system prompt examples use 'Execution Rules' and 'Quality Gates' but lack explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags) to wrap untrusted tool output.
- Capability inventory: The proposed agent has extensive capabilities including
read_file,write_file,run_command, andsearch_files(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill recommends 'Human-in-the-Loop Checkpoints' for high-risk operations like file deletions or production deployments as a mitigation strategy.
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