github
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface through ingestion of untrusted GitHub metadata.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads pull request titles, branch names, and status through
gh prcommands inSKILL.mdandreferences/stacked-pr-workflow.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when processing external PR content to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in PR titles.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to execute
gitandghCLI commands inSKILL.mdandreferences/stacked-pr-workflow.md, includinggit push --force-with-leaseandgh pr merge. - Sanitization: Pull request metadata (such as titles) is interpolated directly into CLI command arguments (e.g.,
gh pr merge <N> --squash --title "<PR title> (#N)") without escaping or validation.
Audit Metadata