external-llm-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill collects project-specific information, including the contents of
CLAUDE.md, development lessons stored in the.agents/lessons/directory, and source code changes viagit diff. This data is then passed as arguments to thecodexandgeminicommand-line interfaces, which transmit the information to external third-party servers for processing. While this is the stated purpose of the skill, users should ensure they have permission to share this intellectual property with external providers. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates untrusted content from the local filesystem (such as source code changes and project documentation) directly into prompts sent to external LLMs. If a file being reviewed contains malicious instructions (e.g., hidden in code comments), it could manipulate the external model's output.
- Ingestion points: Content from
CLAUDE.md,.agents/lessons/*.md, and the output ofgit diffcommands. - Boundary markers: The skill uses simple string interpolation to build the prompt for the CLI execution without robust delimiters or instructions to the external model to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes
codex execandgeminiCLI tools to process the gathered data. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the gathered file content or diff output is performed before transmission.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation instructs the user to install external CLI tools, specifically the
@openai/codexpackage from the NPM registry and the Gemini CLI from Google. These are well-known services and trusted organizations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands to gather project state (using
git,cat,ls, andhead) and then executes external binaries (codexandgemini) to perform the code review.
Audit Metadata