layered-rails
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a methodology for the agent to analyze and refactor Rails codebases, including the 'Specification Test' and 'God Object Detection'. Processing untrusted source code creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the code contains malicious instructions or adversarial data patterns.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to process project files within directories such as
app/models/,app/controllers/, andapp/services/(specified inreferences/extraction-signals.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to ensure the agent ignores instructions embedded within the codebase being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill identifies capabilities such as shell command execution for complexity metrics and mentions the use of specialized tools like
rails-refactorerfor code modification. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating code content before the agent evaluates it against the architectural rules.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides specific shell command pipelines for the agent or developer to use when measuring code churn and complexity.
- Evidence:
references/extraction-signals.mdcontains complex shell commands usinggit log,sort,uniq, andwc(e.g.,git log --since="6 months ago" --name-only --pretty=format: | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -20). While intended for local diagnostics, these commands would be executed by the agent in the user's environment.
Audit Metadata