agent-estate
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions require cloning a repository from an external, unverified GitHub source (
github.com/MercuriusDream/agent-estate.git) rather than using the author's verified infrastructure. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the user to grant execution permissions (
chmod +x) to shell scripts (setup-estate.sh,stop-hook.sh) which are then executed within the local environment to manage the agent's lifecycle. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A shell hook (
stop-hook.sh) is used to intercept the agent's 'Stop' event. The script programmatically blocks the exit command by returning a 'block' decision and re-injecting prompts, overriding standard process termination behavior. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to override the agent's normal operational boundaries, commanding it to "never stop" and "immediately start the next cycle" regardless of task completion.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a ledger system (
.claude/agent-estate.md) that acts as a cross-context memory bridge. - Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read the ledger file at the beginning of every cycle (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: There are no sanitization boundaries or "ignore embedded instruction" warnings present in the ledger handling logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to modify local files, execute shell scripts, and control process exit status.
- Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the "Tell The Next Claude" section of the ledger, allowing instructions from one execution cycle to influence the behavior of the next cycle.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata