ask-opencli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the installation of a global npm package
@jackwener/openclifrom an unverified third-party source. It also refers to a local developer path for a Chrome extension at~/Desktop/code/AI/tools/opencli/extension/, which suggests a non-standard and unverified execution environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: User-provided input in the
{{PROMPT}}placeholder is directly interpolated into shell commands (e.g.,opencli grok ask "{{PROMPT}}"). This presents a command injection risk if the user input contains shell metacharacters or specifically crafted quotes designed to break out of the command string. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data entering the agent context via the output of the
openclicommand (Grok/Gemini responses). The analysis of the skill reveals: - Ingestion points: User input
{{PROMPT}}and the resulting stdout from theopenclitool. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the external AI responses.
- Capability inventory: Uses the
Bashtool to executeopencliand shell commands. - Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on the prompt or the retrieved response before processing.
Audit Metadata