clash-routes
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes Python code at runtime by interpolating the shell variable
$FILTER(sourced from user-provided$ARGUMENTS) directly into a script string passed topython3 -c. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The lack of escaping when inserting
$FILTERinto the Python command linefilt = '$FILTER'.strip().lower()allows for arbitrary Python code injection. A malicious input containing single quotes and Python syntax can escape the string literal and execute commands on the host system. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The execution flow involves reading sensitive authentication tokens from local configuration files, specifically targetting
~/.config/clash/config.yamland the Clash Verge Rev application support directory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection based on the following: 1. Ingestion points: Ingests untrusted data via
$ARGUMENTSand external Mihomo API responses. 2. Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat external content as untrusted. 3. Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful tools includingBashandpython3, providing a high-impact exploitation path. 4. Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, filtering, or escaping before processing external data.
Audit Metadata