sol-luna-router
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external repository content and task-specific prompt files, creating an inherent attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The worker agent ingests content from the target repository and the task file specified via the
--prompt-fileargument inscripts/run_luna_worker.py. - Boundary markers: The skill instructs the commander to use structured text headers (Role, Objective, Constraints, Done when) to delimit context in task files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via the
codexCLI and perform file operations within the specified sandbox. - Sanitization: The skill enforces
--strict-configfor the worker and provides aread-onlysandbox with isolated cache directories for review tasks to mitigate unauthorized modifications. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes external CLI tools to manage the worker lifecycle and repository state.
- Evidence:
scripts/run_luna_worker.pyusessubprocess.Popento call thecodexexecutable andsubprocess.runto callgit. - Mitigation: Command arguments are passed as lists rather than strings, avoiding shell interpolation risks. The script also validates that the
codexbinary is a regular file with execution permissions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill records operational telemetry to a local ledger.
- Evidence:
scripts/run_luna_worker.pyappends JSON records to$CODEX_HOME/state/sol-luna-router/runs.jsonl. - Mitigation: The implementation explicitly excludes sensitive data such as prompt text, response bodies, and raw error messages from the logs. It enforces restrictive file permissions (
0600) and directory permissions (0700) to ensure only the user can access the telemetry.
Audit Metadata