baoyu-infographic
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes arbitrary user-provided content and explicitly requires the agent to preserve this data verbatim when constructing prompts for an image generation skill. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in the source text could influence the behavior of the downstream process.
- Ingestion points: User content is ingested from files or text input and saved to
source.mdin Step 1.2. - Boundary markers: The
references/base-prompt.mdtemplate interpolates content using{{CONTENT}}without delimiters (like XML tags) or instructions to treat the data as untrusted. - Capability inventory: The skill invokes an image generation skill in Step 6, which uses the instructions generated from the user's input.
- Sanitization: The skill's core principles and the
references/analysis-framework.mdmandate verbatim extraction and forbid summarization or rephrasing, which ensures any injection payloads remain intact. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to locate configuration files.
- Evidence: Step 1.1 in
SKILL.mdusestest -fto search forEXTEND.mdin both the project directory and the user's home directory ($HOME/.baoyu-skills/). While these are standard configuration checks, they involve automated command execution targeting the user's file system.
Audit Metadata