pdf

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted PDF files from the user's environment, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: PDF content is read via pypdf.PdfReader in scripts/extract_form_field_info.py, pdfplumber.open in scripts/extract_form_structure.py, and convert_from_path in scripts/convert_pdf_to_images.py.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the PDF text or metadata.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file writing capabilities (via pypdf, PIL, and pdfplumber) and can output extracted text to the agent's context.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the extracted text or form data before it is presented to the agent.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes runtime modification of library behavior to handle specific PDF form structures.
  • Evidence: The script scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py contains a monkeypatch_pydpf_method function that replaces DictionaryObject.get_inherited in the pypdf library with a custom implementation at runtime. While this is used for functional correction of choice field handling, dynamic execution and library patching are notable patterns.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 21, 2026, 04:15 PM