Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted PDF files from the user's environment, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: PDF content is read via
pypdf.PdfReaderinscripts/extract_form_field_info.py,pdfplumber.openinscripts/extract_form_structure.py, andconvert_from_pathinscripts/convert_pdf_to_images.py. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the PDF text or metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file writing capabilities (via
pypdf,PIL, andpdfplumber) and can output extracted text to the agent's context. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the extracted text or form data before it is presented to the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes runtime modification of library behavior to handle specific PDF form structures.
- Evidence: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pycontains amonkeypatch_pydpf_methodfunction that replacesDictionaryObject.get_inheritedin thepypdflibrary with a custom implementation at runtime. While this is used for functional correction of choice field handling, dynamic execution and library patching are notable patterns.
Audit Metadata