mj-notes-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external voice notes which can influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Fetches note data using the command
getnote notes --limit 50 -o jsonin Step 1. - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill processes the
contentfield directly to extract tasks and diary entries. - Capability inventory: The agent can perform file writes to
~/code/makerjackie/01mvp/, update existing notes viagetnote note update, and invoke other potentially sensitive skills likemj-deployormj-cf-dns. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of note content is described.
- Mitigation: A mandatory human-in-the-loop checkpoint is enforced in Step 4, requiring the user to confirm the execution plan before any action is taken.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses local file system paths for its operations.
- Evidence: Accesses and modifies
~/.agents/mj-notes-workflow/state.jsonfor persistent state tracking. - Evidence: Writes content to documentation paths within
~/code/makerjackie/01mvp/apps/01mvp-web/content/docs/. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of a local CLI tool to interact with the Getnote service.
- Evidence: Uses
getnote notes,getnote note update, andgetnote saveto manage note lifecycle and summaries.
Audit Metadata