effect-review-v4
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow for analyzing external codebases introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads files from the local filesystem and remote PRs using
git diff,gh pr diff, andgit ls-files(inSKILL.md), and passes this content to sub-agents for evaluation. - Boundary markers: The prompt template for sub-agents (the
Shared: Agent Promptsection inSKILL.md) does not use delimiters to wrap the code content, nor does it include explicit instructions for the agents to ignore potential prompts or commands embedded in comments or strings within the code files. - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Agenttool for task delegation and shell-based developer tools (git,gh). If a sub-agent is successfully injected by code content, it could potentially misuse its assigned tools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization, filtering, or escaping before the code is provided to the sub-agents.
Audit Metadata