skills/malinskibeniamin/skills/eli5/Gen Agent Trust Hub

eli5

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instruction 'The request or $ARGUMENTS is authoritative' explicitly tells the agent to treat external, potentially untrusted input as the primary source of truth, which could be exploited to bypass other instructions or safety constraints.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external 'source material' (modules, incidents, facts) and user-provided arguments to generate explanations, creating a surface where malicious instructions embedded in that material could influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Uses $ARGUMENTS and external source material for explainers.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit prompt delimiters for external content, though it instructs the agent to separate facts and inference.
  • Capability inventory: Generates HTML/JavaScript artifacts, writes to the file system, and opens files in a browser or previewer.
  • Sanitization: The skill includes an instruction to 'Escape untrusted text', though the efficacy depends on the agent's implementation.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to generate HTML and JavaScript artifacts at runtime based on external data and then 'Open it in an isolated browser or host preview', creating a risk associated with executing dynamically generated code.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions suggest using the mktemp utility to create temporary directories, which involves the execution of shell commands on the host system.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 24, 2026, 01:57 PM