grilling
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions hidden in data could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill is instructed to read requests, plans, repository contents, tests, documentation, references, and decisions from the user's environment (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to use boundary markers, delimiters, or to ignore embedded instructions when processing these external sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes filesystem search, environment exploration, and triggers specialized tools and sub-routines like /brain-dump, /plan-arbiter, /resilience-review, and /steelman (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content ingested from external repository files or user documents.
Audit Metadata