video-research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and executes external packages from public registries at runtime.
- Evidence:
- Fetches
mcp-video-analyzer@0.7.1viabunxinscripts/analyze-video.sh. - Fetches
yt-dlp==2026.7.4viauvxinscripts/yt-dlp-uvx.sh. - Fetches
openai-whisper==20250625viauvxinscripts/openai-whisper.sh. - Fetches
mlx-whisper==0.4.3viauvxinscripts/mlx-whisper.sh. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a shell orchestrator to execute multiple analysis tools based on user-supplied input.
- Evidence:
scripts/analyze-video.shexecutesbunx,uvx, andpython3subprocesses.- The
$sourcevariable (video URL or path) is passed to the analyzer tool. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external videos which could contain malicious instructions targeting the agent.
- Ingestion points: Video metadata (title, duration), transcripts (speech-to-text), and OCR results (on-screen text) are extracted from URLs or local files and written to
research.mdviascripts/analyze-video.sh. - Boundary markers: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a manual verification instruction: "verify important wording at timestamp/frame before quoting", but no technical boundary markers (delimiters) are used in the generated research artifacts. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities (
transcript.txt,research.md,analysis.json) and subprocess execution viabunx,uvx, andpython3. - Sanitization: The Python rendering script in
scripts/analyze-video.shperforms basic whitespace cleaning usingclean()but does not sanitize for prompt injection markers in the video metadata or extracted text.
Audit Metadata