video-research

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and executes external packages from public registries at runtime.
  • Evidence:
  • Fetches mcp-video-analyzer@0.7.1 via bunx in scripts/analyze-video.sh.
  • Fetches yt-dlp==2026.7.4 via uvx in scripts/yt-dlp-uvx.sh.
  • Fetches openai-whisper==20250625 via uvx in scripts/openai-whisper.sh.
  • Fetches mlx-whisper==0.4.3 via uvx in scripts/mlx-whisper.sh.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a shell orchestrator to execute multiple analysis tools based on user-supplied input.
  • Evidence:
  • scripts/analyze-video.sh executes bunx, uvx, and python3 subprocesses.
  • The $source variable (video URL or path) is passed to the analyzer tool.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external videos which could contain malicious instructions targeting the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Video metadata (title, duration), transcripts (speech-to-text), and OCR results (on-screen text) are extracted from URLs or local files and written to research.md via scripts/analyze-video.sh.
  • Boundary markers: The SKILL.md file contains a manual verification instruction: "verify important wording at timestamp/frame before quoting", but no technical boundary markers (delimiters) are used in the generated research artifacts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities (transcript.txt, research.md, analysis.json) and subprocess execution via bunx, uvx, and python3.
  • Sanitization: The Python rendering script in scripts/analyze-video.sh performs basic whitespace cleaning using clean() but does not sanitize for prompt injection markers in the video metadata or extracted text.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 11, 2026, 02:00 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — video-research