serena-mcp-agent

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches code and components from external sources, specifically github.com/oraios/serena and ghcr.io/oraios/serena, to install and run the Serena MCP server.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Configuration examples for various LLM clients (Claude, Codex, etc.) instruct the use of uvx to download and execute the Serena server package directly from a Git repository at runtime.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes the execute_shell_command tool, which allows the agent to execute arbitrary commands on the user's system. The documentation acknowledges this risk, advising users to disable the tool in untrusted contexts or use a read-only mode.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes external codebase content and project-specific memories which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through tools like read_file, find_symbol, and read_memory which retrieve content from the project directory.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within the processed code files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses high-impact capabilities including arbitrary shell execution (execute_shell_command) and the ability to modify project files (replace_symbol_body, create_text_file).
  • Sanitization: The skill does not describe any specific sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from the codebase before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 01:51 AM