serena-mcp-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches code and components from external sources, specifically
github.com/oraios/serenaandghcr.io/oraios/serena, to install and run the Serena MCP server.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Configuration examples for various LLM clients (Claude, Codex, etc.) instruct the use ofuvxto download and execute the Serena server package directly from a Git repository at runtime.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes theexecute_shell_commandtool, which allows the agent to execute arbitrary commands on the user's system. The documentation acknowledges this risk, advising users to disable the tool in untrusted contexts or use a read-only mode.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes external codebase content and project-specific memories which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through tools like
read_file,find_symbol, andread_memorywhich retrieve content from the project directory. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within the processed code files.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses high-impact capabilities including arbitrary shell execution (
execute_shell_command) and the ability to modify project files (replace_symbol_body,create_text_file). - Sanitization: The skill does not describe any specific sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from the codebase before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata