cmux-cua
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by launching and communicating with a bundled helper binary named
cmux-cua(and a nested helper application) located within the~/Library/Application Support/cmux/cmux-cua/directory. This binary is responsible for all accessibility tree inspection and UI interaction. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: To function, the skill requires the user to grant high-privilege macOS permissions to the helper application, specifically 'Accessibility' (
AXIsProcessTrusted) and 'Screen Recording' (CGPreflightScreenCaptureAccess). These permissions allow for full control over the user interface and the ability to capture screen content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from untrusted sources (screenshots and accessibility trees of third-party apps and websites). This creates a surface where malicious content within those applications could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
get_app_stateandget_window_statetools in the form of screenshots and UI metadata. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the data returned from the GUI perception tools.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including clicking, typing, dragging, and reading screen content, which could be abused if an injection succeeds.
- Sanitization: While the skill includes 'obstruction-checking' for pixel clicks, there is no evidence of textual sanitization or filtering for instructions embedded within the application UI trees it processes.
Audit Metadata