grow-business

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the agent to suggest or facilitate the installation of external code via the command npx skills add wondelai/skills --global. This command fetches code from an unverified repository associated with the 'wondelai' account.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By encouraging the global installation of packages from an untrusted source, the skill enables potential remote code execution on the user's host environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents and promotes shell commands for software installation that execute with high privileges, creating a vector for system compromise if the remote repository is malicious.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) and contains metadata inconsistencies.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read content from docs/MARKETING.md, docs/OFFER.md, docs/STRATEGY.md, docs/METRICS.md, and docs/CUSTOMER.md to inform its execution logic.
  • Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the files being processed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can invoke other local skills, modify the filesystem in the docs/ folder, and execute shell commands.
  • Sanitization: Content retrieved from project documentation is used to drive agent behavior without validation or sanitization, potentially allowing external data to hijack the agent's flow.
  • Metadata inconsistency: The metadata author field ('wondelai') does not match the verified author context provided ('manish31-oss').
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 23, 2026, 06:49 PM