grow-business
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the agent to suggest or facilitate the installation of external code via the command
npx skills add wondelai/skills --global. This command fetches code from an unverified repository associated with the 'wondelai' account. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By encouraging the global installation of packages from an untrusted source, the skill enables potential remote code execution on the user's host environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents and promotes shell commands for software installation that execute with high privileges, creating a vector for system compromise if the remote repository is malicious.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) and contains metadata inconsistencies.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read content from
docs/MARKETING.md,docs/OFFER.md,docs/STRATEGY.md,docs/METRICS.md, anddocs/CUSTOMER.mdto inform its execution logic. - Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the files being processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill can invoke other local skills, modify the filesystem in the
docs/folder, and execute shell commands. - Sanitization: Content retrieved from project documentation is used to drive agent behavior without validation or sanitization, potentially allowing external data to hijack the agent's flow.
- Metadata inconsistency: The metadata
authorfield ('wondelai') does not match the verified author context provided ('manish31-oss').
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata