restinstance
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions facilitate the processing of external API response data which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: API response bodies and headers processed via
GET,POST,PUT, andPATCHkeywords throughout the skill, specifically inSKILL.mdandreferences/keywords-reference.md. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes keywords that perform network operations and file system operations, such as
Create Fileshown inassets/examples/schema-validation.robotandEvaluatefor Python execution. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit guidance for the agent to use delimiters or ignore potential instructions embedded within the JSON response data returned by external endpoints.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content of the API responses is performed before the data is logged or used in subsequent logic.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation and example files contain hardcoded dummy credentials and API keys. While these are clearly placeholders (e.g.,
sk-test-key-12345inreferences/authentication.md), they demonstrate patterns for hardcoding secrets. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill examples frequently use the Robot Framework
Evaluatekeyword, which allows for the execution of arbitrary Python code (e.g., inreferences/authentication.mdandassets/examples/json-manipulation.robot). While this is standard functionality for the library, it provides a powerful mechanism for dynamic code execution if the input to the evaluation is influenced by untrusted external data.
Audit Metadata