rf-platynui

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in the UI elements of an application being automated.
  • Ingestion points: The agent ingests data from the desktop accessibility tree (UIA/AT-SPI2) via XPath queries and attribute retrieval as described in references/locators-and-queries.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters provided to help the agent distinguish between UI metadata and untrusted text content within the application UI.
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides full interaction capabilities, including Keyboard Type and Pointer Click (documented in references/keywords-reference.md), which could be misused if the agent obeys instructions found in the UI.
  • Sanitization: No validation or filtering mechanisms are documented for data retrieved from UI nodes before it is processed by the agent.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the user to install the PlatynUI library and its associated CLI tools from the public Python package registry.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md and references/cli-and-inspector.md provide pip and uv commands to install robotframework-PlatynUI (pinning version 0.12.0.dev330), platynui-cli, and platynui-inspector.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes external libraries to execute local system processes.
  • Evidence: The example in assets/examples/calculator.robot uses the Robot Framework Process library to execute calc.exe as part of the test setup.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 1, 2026, 10:53 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — rf-platynui