navara-lp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to ingest and process data from local configuration files (
lp.jsonand locale-specific JSON) and to scrape content from external live websites to extract attribution information (specifically targeting the.navara-attr-itemclass). This ingestion of external, untrusted content presents an indirect prompt injection surface. - Ingestion points: Data is read from
docs/src/data/lp.json,docs/src/data/lp-locales/*.json, and external websites during the attribution scraping process. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or guardrails to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions that might be embedded in the scraped content or local data files.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment allows for shell command execution via
pnpm(for building, formatting, and linting), file system modifications, and network requests to fetch API data and scrape external sites. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for sanitizing or validating the content retrieved from external websites before it is incorporated into the project metadata or locale strings.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches geographic data from the Overpass API using the well-known endpoints
overpass-api.deandoverpass.kumi.systems. These are standard sources for OpenStreetMap data used in the project's rendering workflow. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several local development commands via
pnpm, includingpnpm build,pnpm preview,pnpm run build:example,pnpm run format, andpnpm run lint. It also involves launching a browser via Playwright for automated screenshot capture as part of the verification process.
Audit Metadata