second-opinion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
codexCLI to perform several tasks, including checking login status (codex login status), executing reasoning tasks (codex exec), and performing code reviews (codex exec review). These commands are standard operations for the tool's intended use. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
codexCLI transmits prompt data to and receives answers from OpenAI's API. Interaction with OpenAI, a well-known service provider, is the fundamental purpose of the skill and is documented as such. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a workflow where data from the local repository (such as source code and git logs) is sent to an external AI model, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads repository files, git history, and user questions, which are then written to a temporary
prompt.mdfile for processing by the CLI tool. - Boundary markers: The instructions mandate the use of the
-s read-onlyflag when running thecodextool, which is designed to prevent the sub-agent from executing write operations or initiating its own network requests. - Capability inventory: The skill leverages the
codex execcommand, which possesses the ability to explore the repository and execute read-only commands as part of its reasoning process. - Sanitization: There are no documented steps for sanitizing or filtering repository content before it is processed by the external model.
Audit Metadata