worktrees
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a variety of shell commands to manage parallel development environments. This includes git operations (
git worktree add,git worktree list,git worktree remove), application management (docker compose up,make tailwindcss), and background process execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses user-supplied branch names as variables in shell commands (e.g.,
git worktree add .worktrees/<branch-name> -b <branch-name>). This creates a vulnerability where an adversarial user could provide a branch name containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&&,||) to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. - Ingestion points: User-provided branch name input in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent.
- Capability inventory: File system access, process management, and network tool execution (via
git,sed,docker,kill). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill relies on natural language instructions for the agent to follow naming conventions rather than enforcing programmatic sanitization.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The workflow explicitly directs the agent to copy environment files (
cp ../../.env* .) from the project root into worktree subdirectories. As.envfiles typically contain sensitive credentials such as API keys and database passwords, this practice involves the programmatic handling and duplication of secrets. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local helper scripts (
scripts/allocate-ports.shandscripts/shutdown-services.sh) at runtime. The shutdown script dynamically discovers and terminates processes usinglsofandkillbased on port values parsed from.envfiles, which could lead to unintended process termination if the environment configuration is manipulated.
Audit Metadata