skills/maratraevskiy/skills/tududi/Gen Agent Trust Hub

tududi

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides instructions in references/setup.md to modify the user's shell profile (~/.zshrc) to export the TUDUDI_API_TOKEN environment variable. Modifying shell profiles to execute code or set variables on startup is a documented persistence mechanism.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted meeting transcripts, which creates a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in the transcript data.
  • Ingestion points: External session transcripts retrieved via the anarlog CLI tool, as described in references/anarlog.md.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not specify delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within transcripts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can perform network writes to the Tududi API (references/api.md) and create or modify files in the docs/anarlog/ directory (references/anarlog.md).
  • Sanitization: None identified; there is no mention of validating, filtering, or escaping the transcript content before it is processed or written to other locations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local system commands using the anarlog CLI to list, retrieve, and archive meeting data. It also references the use of security find-generic-password on macOS to retrieve secrets from the system Keychain.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with an external API at a configurable base_url to synchronize repository state and tasks. It uses bearer token authentication to perform these network operations.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 9, 2026, 11:00 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — tududi