tududi
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides instructions in
references/setup.mdto modify the user's shell profile (~/.zshrc) to export theTUDUDI_API_TOKENenvironment variable. Modifying shell profiles to execute code or set variables on startup is a documented persistence mechanism. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted meeting transcripts, which creates a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in the transcript data.
- Ingestion points: External session transcripts retrieved via the
anarlogCLI tool, as described inreferences/anarlog.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not specify delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within transcripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform network writes to the Tududi API (
references/api.md) and create or modify files in thedocs/anarlog/directory (references/anarlog.md). - Sanitization: None identified; there is no mention of validating, filtering, or escaping the transcript content before it is processed or written to other locations.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local system commands using the
anarlogCLI to list, retrieve, and archive meeting data. It also references the use ofsecurity find-generic-passwordon macOS to retrieve secrets from the system Keychain. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with an external API at a configurable
base_urlto synchronize repository state and tasks. It uses bearer token authentication to perform these network operations.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata