pr-comments-audit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub pull request comments and review threads which may contain malicious instructions designed to hijack the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Pull request comments, review bodies, and discussion threads are fetched by
scripts/fetch_review_context.pyusing GraphQL queries. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the fetched PR content strictly as data, increasing the risk of the agent "obeying" instructions found within comments.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to modify source code, create commits, and push changes to the remote repository (
git push). It also has the ability to reply to PR threads and resolve them. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the fetched content before it is interpolated into the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external commands via the GitHub CLI (
gh) to interact with the repository and fetch data. - Evidence:
subprocess.runcalls inscripts/fetch_review_context.pyexecutegh auth status,gh repo view,gh pr view, andgh api graphql. While these are implemented using argument lists (avoidingshell=True), they provide the agent with a powerful interface to the GitHub platform.
Audit Metadata