hyprland
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation in
README.mdandinstall.shencourages installation via a piped shell command (curl -fsSL ... | bash). This script is hosted on the author's personal GitHub repository and is designed to clone or update the skill's file structure. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The developer utility
scripts/generate-references.shperforms a shallow clone of the officialhyprwm/hyprland-wikirepository to pull the latest documentation into thereferences/directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection attack surface (Category 8):
- Ingestion points: Documentation files in
references/*.mdare ingested into the agent's context based on user queries. - Boundary markers: Absent;
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to read the reference files directly without specifying delimiters or warnings regarding embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill is designed for system configuration, implying the agent will likely have shell access and command execution capabilities to assist the user.
- Sanitization: Absent; external markdown content is processed without filtering or validation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The reference files contain extensive examples of shell commands for package management (
pacman,zypper,apt), system service control (systemctl), and hardware configuration (chvt). While these are contextually relevant for Hyprland setup, they represent a broad set of capabilities the agent might be prompted to execute.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/marceloeatworld/hyprland-ai-skill/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata