skills/marcioaltoe/skills/humanizer/Gen Agent Trust Hub

humanizer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user-supplied text, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted content is ingested via conversational input or by reading file paths as specified in the Invocation Modes section of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not employ delimiters or specific directives to ignore embedded instructions within the user text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill prompt in SKILL.md does not have access to tools for network exfiltration, file system modifications, or arbitrary shell execution.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not describe methods for escaping or filtering the input text.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The repository includes scripts/validate-package.py for developer maintenance.
  • The script reads local files (SKILL.md, README.md, and .claude-plugin/plugin.json) to verify metadata consistency.
  • The operations are limited to string matching and JSON parsing using standard Python libraries and do not execute arbitrary shell commands.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Installation instructions in README.md suggest using the skills CLI tool via npx to fetch the skill from skills.sh.
  • The README.md also references the Claude Code plugin marketplace for installation. These references facilitate skill distribution and setup.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 26, 2026, 05:21 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — humanizer