humanizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user-supplied text, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is ingested via conversational input or by reading file paths as specified in the
Invocation Modessection ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not employ delimiters or specific directives to ignore embedded instructions within the user text.
- Capability inventory: The skill prompt in
SKILL.mddoes not have access to tools for network exfiltration, file system modifications, or arbitrary shell execution. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not describe methods for escaping or filtering the input text.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The repository includes
scripts/validate-package.pyfor developer maintenance. - The script reads local files (
SKILL.md,README.md, and.claude-plugin/plugin.json) to verify metadata consistency. - The operations are limited to string matching and JSON parsing using standard Python libraries and do not execute arbitrary shell commands.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Installation instructions in
README.mdsuggest using theskillsCLI tool vianpxto fetch the skill fromskills.sh. - The
README.mdalso references the Claude Code plugin marketplace for installation. These references facilitate skill distribution and setup.
Audit Metadata