Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it extracts text and structural data from external, untrusted PDF files. If a processed PDF contains malicious instructions, the agent might interpret them as authoritative guidelines during form analysis or data extraction.
- Ingestion points: PDF content is ingested via
pypdf,pdfplumber, andpdfjs-distinSKILL.md,forms.md, andreference.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the provided scripts or prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to create/modify files (
PdfWriter) and execute shell commands (qpdf,magick,pdftotext). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the extracted PDF text before it is presented to the agent for decision-making.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute several command-line utilities for PDF processing, including
qpdf,pdftotext,pdfimages,pdftoppm, and the ImageMagickmagicktool for cropping images. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on and references several well-known external libraries and tools. These include Python packages (
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pytesseract,pdf2image,pypdfium2,pandas), JavaScript libraries (pdf-lib,pdfjs-dist), and system utilities (poppler-utils,qpdf,pdftk).
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