skills/marcioaltoe/skills/pdf/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pdf

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it extracts text and structural data from external, untrusted PDF files. If a processed PDF contains malicious instructions, the agent might interpret them as authoritative guidelines during form analysis or data extraction.
  • Ingestion points: PDF content is ingested via pypdf, pdfplumber, and pdfjs-dist in SKILL.md, forms.md, and reference.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the provided scripts or prompts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to create/modify files (PdfWriter) and execute shell commands (qpdf, magick, pdftotext).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the extracted PDF text before it is presented to the agent for decision-making.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute several command-line utilities for PDF processing, including qpdf, pdftotext, pdfimages, pdftoppm, and the ImageMagick magick tool for cropping images.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on and references several well-known external libraries and tools. These include Python packages (pypdf, pdfplumber, reportlab, pytesseract, pdf2image, pypdfium2, pandas), JavaScript libraries (pdf-lib, pdfjs-dist), and system utilities (poppler-utils, qpdf, pdftk).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 21, 2026, 06:49 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pdf