write-prd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform filesystem management using shell commands, specifically
mkdir -pfor directory creation andgit mvfor moving source documents into specification folders. It also explicitly calls for the execution of theroundfixCLI tool (e.g.,roundfix spec checkandroundfix spec judge) to verify the generated artifacts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, which presents a risk of indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in those sources could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads from
inbox/<repository>/,docs/findings/, anddocs/backlog/, and is also instructed to perform web research for market and competitor context. - Boundary markers: While the skill enforces a strict PRD template and glossary declaration process, it does not specify the use of clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested source material.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the filesystem (creating
_prd.md,_index.md, and_authorization.md), move repository files viagit, and execute external CLI tools. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the content retrieved from inbox entries or findings is mentioned before it is incorporated into the PRD.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the dynamic execution of the
roundfixtool suite to perform automated checks and advisory judgments on the documentation produced at runtime. Notably, the skill includes a safety instruction advising the agent to never print, store, or ask for API keys (e.g.,ROUNDFIX_OPENROUTER_API_KEY) associated with the tool's backend services.
Audit Metadata