xlsx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyuses high-risk dynamic code execution patterns. It generates C source code at runtime, compiles it into a shared library (.so) usinggcc, and then uses theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject this library into thesoffice(LibreOffice) process. While documented as a workaround for socket restrictions, this provides a mechanism for arbitrary code execution within system processes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs several high-risk command line operations via
subprocess.run. It invokesgccfor compilation andsofficefor spreadsheet processing. Additionally, the scriptscripts/recalc.pyimplements a persistence mechanism by writing a StarBasic macro (Module1.xba) directly into the user's LibreOffice configuration directory (e.g.,~/.config/libreoffice/4/user/basic/Standard). This persists changes to the application's environment across different sessions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted spreadsheet files while maintaining extensive system-level capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context when reading Excel or CSV files using
pandas.read_exceloropenpyxl.load_workbook(referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, compile source code, perform process injection, and modify application configuration files (found in
scripts/recalc.pyandscripts/office/soffice.py). - Sanitization: Absent. External content is interpolated directly into model workflows without filtering or validation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata