agent-browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill's state management system (commands like
state saveand--session-name) stores browser cookies and session tokens in plaintext files on the local disk by default. While encryption is supported, it is an opt-in feature requiring manual setup of theAGENT_BROWSER_ENCRYPTION_KEYenvironment variable. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Multiple commands allow for the extraction of sensitive information, including reading the system clipboard (
clipboard read), accessing local files via thefile://protocol (--allow-file-access), and connecting to the user's active Chrome instance to extract session data and cookies (--auto-connect). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
evalcommand enables the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context. The documentation encourages using Base64 encoding or stdin to pass scripts, which can be used to obscure malicious intent from simple log or prompt analysis. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires downloading a browser binary (Chrome/Chromium) at runtime via the
agent-browser installcommand. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a major vector for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted external web content. It includes an opt-in safety feature (
AGENT_BROWSER_CONTENT_BOUNDARIES) to mark tool output, but this is not active by default. Ingestion points: Web pages processed viaopen,snapshot, andget text(SKILL.md, references/snapshot-refs.md). Boundary markers: Opt-inAGENT_BROWSER_PAGE_CONTENTmarkers are available but disabled by default. Capability inventory:eval,fill,click,network route,clipboard write, andstate save(references/commands.md). Sanitization: No automatic sanitization is performed on ingested page content before it is returned to the agent context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata