document-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface detected in the document review workflow.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads the full text of documents from paths provided by the user or discovered via file-search/globbing tools in Phase 1 of
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The
subagent-template.mduses<review-context>XML-like tags to encapsulate the document content. However, it lacks explicit instructions to the sub-agent to disregard or ignore any instruction-like text embedded within the document content itself. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator skill possesses the capability to modify files using the platform's
edittool. In Phase 4 ofSKILL.md, the skill is instructed to apply "auto-fixes" to the document in a single pass without seeking user approval. Additionally, it uses anAgentorspawntool to execute sub-agents with the injected content. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or schema validation performed on the
{document_content}variable before it is interpolated into the prompt template. This allows an attacker to include instructions in a document that could manipulate the sub-agent's JSON output, potentially causing the orchestrator to perform unintended edits to the filesystem.
Audit Metadata