auto-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its core functionality of ingesting and processing untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: Step 1 in
SKILL.mddescribes fetching and analyzing content from user-provided website URLs. - Boundary markers: None. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to prevent the agent from obeying instructions potentially hidden in the scraped website content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Read,Write, andBashtools, allowing it to modify the local environment and execute shell commands. - Sanitization: None. The skill extracts raw text (headlines, copy, CTAs) and directly interpolates it into new
SKILL.mdtemplates. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to retrieve content from external domains.
- Evidence: Step 1 involves fetching page content for analysis. While targeting user-provided URLs, this represents a network ingestion surface for untrusted data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool and performs dynamic generation of executable agent instructions. - Evidence: The skill is configured with
allowed-tools: Bash. Steps 2, 3, and 4 involve generating code for newSKILL.mdfiles (brand-voice, ICP, and landing-pages) which are then written to the.claude/skills/directory. These files define future agent behavior, effectively acting as runtime-generated scripts.
Audit Metadata