auto-setup

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its core functionality of ingesting and processing untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion points: Step 1 in SKILL.md describes fetching and analyzing content from user-provided website URLs.
  • Boundary markers: None. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to prevent the agent from obeying instructions potentially hidden in the scraped website content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Read, Write, and Bash tools, allowing it to modify the local environment and execute shell commands.
  • Sanitization: None. The skill extracts raw text (headlines, copy, CTAs) and directly interpolates it into new SKILL.md templates.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to retrieve content from external domains.
  • Evidence: Step 1 involves fetching page content for analysis. While targeting user-provided URLs, this represents a network ingestion surface for untrusted data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool and performs dynamic generation of executable agent instructions.
  • Evidence: The skill is configured with allowed-tools: Bash. Steps 2, 3, and 4 involve generating code for new SKILL.md files (brand-voice, ICP, and landing-pages) which are then written to the .claude/skills/ directory. These files define future agent behavior, effectively acting as runtime-generated scripts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 18, 2026, 08:28 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — auto-setup