pydicom
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from medical imaging files, which is a necessary part of its core functionality.
- Ingestion points:
pydicom.dcmreadis used to load data from.dcmfiles inscripts/anonymize_dicom.py,scripts/dicom_to_image.py, andscripts/extract_metadata.py. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within DICOM metadata tags.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system write capabilities via
ds.save_as()andimage.save(). - Sanitization: DICOM tag values are extracted and displayed or saved without specific sanitization for potential injection characters.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill metadata contains an inconsistency regarding the author's identity.
- The
SKILL.mdfrontmatter lists the author as 'K-Dense Inc.', whereas the provided environment context identifies the author as 'marielynneblock'. This is considered a deceptive metadata pattern, although likely benign in this context.
Audit Metadata