how
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a synthesis workflow where data gathered from the codebase is interpolated into the prompts for explainer subagents. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the analyzed codebase contains malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Findings from explorer agents are passed via the
{EXPLORER_FINDINGS_ALL}placeholder inreferences/explainer-prompt.md, and the user query is passed via{QUESTION}. - Boundary markers: The template uses markdown blockquotes and headers to delimit findings, but lacks explicit instructions to the LLM to ignore or sanitize embedded directives within the findings.
- Capability inventory: The subagents have access to shell tools (
rg,find,sed) and the ability to spawn further subagents. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the findings before they are presented to the explainer agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The explainer agent is directed to use shell commands such as
rg(ripgrep),find, andsedto interact with the codebase. While these are used for architectural analysis, they represent a command execution capability within the skill's instructions. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses the file
~/.config/pstack/pstack-models.mdto retrieve model configuration and mapping information. Although this is part of the tool's internal logic, it involves reading from the user's home directory configuration area.
Audit Metadata