skills/mariusflorescu/pstack-rex/how/Gen Agent Trust Hub

how

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a synthesis workflow where data gathered from the codebase is interpolated into the prompts for explainer subagents. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the analyzed codebase contains malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Findings from explorer agents are passed via the {EXPLORER_FINDINGS_ALL} placeholder in references/explainer-prompt.md, and the user query is passed via {QUESTION}.
  • Boundary markers: The template uses markdown blockquotes and headers to delimit findings, but lacks explicit instructions to the LLM to ignore or sanitize embedded directives within the findings.
  • Capability inventory: The subagents have access to shell tools (rg, find, sed) and the ability to spawn further subagents.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the findings before they are presented to the explainer agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The explainer agent is directed to use shell commands such as rg (ripgrep), find, and sed to interact with the codebase. While these are used for architectural analysis, they represent a command execution capability within the skill's instructions.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses the file ~/.config/pstack/pstack-models.md to retrieve model configuration and mapping information. Although this is part of the tool's internal logic, it involves reading from the user's home directory configuration area.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 1, 2026, 01:24 PM