rex-subagents
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill explicitly spawns subagents with flags that disable all safety filters and user approval prompts.
- Evidence in
scripts/subagent: Claude subagents are launched with the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. - Evidence in
scripts/subagent: Codex subagents are launched with the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
scripts/sessionsutility reads and exposes private conversation history transcripts. - It searches for and parses
.jsonlfiles in~/.claude/projectsand~/.codex/sessions(or custom config directories). - It extracts user prompts and assistant responses from these files to be read as data by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides mechanisms to execute arbitrary shell commands in new terminal panes via the
subagent runcommand. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Several features create an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- The
sessionstool reads historical transcripts; if a previous conversation was influenced by an attacker, reading it could re-inject malicious instructions. - The
subagent pokecommand specifically allows data from "outside" sources (like a local server) to be injected into the main agent's conversation stream. - [PERSISTENCE]: The
scripts/subagenttool spawns a background monitoring process that persists beyond the initial execution. - The
ensure_watcherfunction usesnohupandperlto create a detached session runningwatch.luato monitor the Rex environment for events.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata