rex-subagents

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill explicitly spawns subagents with flags that disable all safety filters and user approval prompts.
  • Evidence in scripts/subagent: Claude subagents are launched with the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag.
  • Evidence in scripts/subagent: Codex subagents are launched with the --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox flag.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The scripts/sessions utility reads and exposes private conversation history transcripts.
  • It searches for and parses .jsonl files in ~/.claude/projects and ~/.codex/sessions (or custom config directories).
  • It extracts user prompts and assistant responses from these files to be read as data by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides mechanisms to execute arbitrary shell commands in new terminal panes via the subagent run command.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Several features create an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • The sessions tool reads historical transcripts; if a previous conversation was influenced by an attacker, reading it could re-inject malicious instructions.
  • The subagent poke command specifically allows data from "outside" sources (like a local server) to be injected into the main agent's conversation stream.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The scripts/subagent tool spawns a background monitoring process that persists beyond the initial execution.
  • The ensure_watcher function uses nohup and perl to create a detached session running watch.lua to monitor the Rex environment for events.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Nov 1, 2026, 01:24 PM