show-me-your-work
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from conversation transcripts to perform audits and cross-model reviews.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
t3_thread_readto ingest the entire conversation history into the agent's context for the purpose of verifying the decision log. - Boundary markers: While the instructions define a structured TSV format for the log, they do not specify delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the processed transcript content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write to the local file system (via
log.sh), delegate tasks to sub-agents (viadelegate_task), and search/read thread history. - Sanitization: The
scripts/log.shutility sanitizes input to prevent spreadsheet formula injection (CSV injection) by prefixing problematic characters with a single quote. However, it does not sanitize the text for LLM instruction injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell script (
scripts/log.sh) to maintain the decision log. This script processes arguments that may contain user-supplied or agent-generated text, which could lead to command-line issues if shell escaping was improperly handled, though the current implementation uses basic character stripping for safety. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The instructions for the
Audit the log against the transcriptsection explicitly acknowledge that using the wrongprojectIdwitht3_thread_searchcould expose unrelated private chats. The skill relies on the agent's internal instruction-following to avoid unauthorized data access across project boundaries.
Audit Metadata