harness-doctor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute a local script (
audit.tsoraudit.py) to process transcript data. This is the primary function of the skill and is triggered by the user via the/harness-doctorcommand. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The tool reads session transcripts from local storage, which may contain sensitive information or credentials. To mitigate risk, the skill implements a redaction engine (
scripts/lib/redact.tsandscripts/lib/redact.py) that filters out common secret patterns (API keys, SSH keys, etc.) by default. A--no-redactflag exists to disable this behavior, but the skill instructions warn to use it only if explicitly requested by the user. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes historical transcript data which may contain untrusted content from past sessions. There is a theoretical risk that malicious content within past transcripts could influence the agent's current analysis.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/lib/scan.tsandscripts/lib/scan.pyread JSONL transcript files from the user's local projects root. - Boundary markers: The agent is instructed to recompute findings from generated fact tables rather than relying on inferred text, and it is told to verify every number before reporting.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute the audit scripts and, with explicit user permission, modify project configuration files such as
CLAUDE.md,settings.json, andpackage.json. - Sanitization: A best-effort redaction mechanism is used when writing diagnostic fact tables to disk, unless the user intentionally disables it.
Audit Metadata